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1. Introduction
Rapid development in telecommunication technologies, especially wireless communications,
has made remote monitoring of patient vital signs feasible. When a signal is transmitted
through a communication channel, accuracy of information transmission at the receiver is
one of the most significant issues. For medical diagnosis, errors in signal processing and
communications introduce substantial artifacts, making pattern recognition and diagnosis less
reliable, leading potentially to an erroneous diagnosis. Consequently, when system resources
are limited, such as transmission bandwidths, appropriate utility of available resources
becomes imperative to ensure accuracy of information.
For a given communication bandwidth, the communication system can first process
original medical signals by waveform transformation, data compression, and quantization
to reduce the data size, which will result in a reduced rate of data transmission through
communication channels, but introduce more information processing errors. This chapter
analyzes fundamental relationships between accuracy of information exchange and available
resources on a platform of wireless local area network (WLAN) systems that involve typical
function blocks of discrete cosine transform, data compression, magnitude quantization,
stochastic WLAN channels, and inverse discrete cosine transform. The main complexity
relationships developed in this chapter provide a trade-off between resource consumptions
and information processing errors, and a strategy for optimal allocation of resources.
An example of these relationships is simulated in a typical medical diagnosis problem
using lung sounds. Respiratory sounds contain a rich reservoir of vital physiological and
pathological information that is of critical importance for clinical diagnosis and patient
management in operating rooms (OR). Several research groups have investigated potential
computer-assisted sound analysis and classifications for asthma, cystic fibrosis, pneumonia,
etc. (17; 19; 24). This chapter evaluates the impact of communication channels on
diagnostic accuracy and the benefits of studying signal processing and communications in
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an integrated framework. The main findings of this chapter indicate that effective utility
of communication resources is essential for tele-monitoring and telemedicine when the
communication bandwidth is shared by many users, and hence is very limited for each
connection.
There are extensive efforts in studying integrated information processing and communication
systems, especially in feedback control. For example Firoozbakhsh et al. (7) provided
a versatile framework for incorporation of sensing, monitoring, information processing
and wireless communication devices. Sayeed (22) proposed a signal modeling framework
for sensor networks that interact between space-time signal sampling, distributed signal
processing, and communications. This chapter is focused on a stochastic analysis and
simulation of complexity relationships among typical components on integrated medical
information processing and communication systems. A stochastic optimization problem
is formulated that explicitly relates communication resources to information transmission
accuracy. Solutions to the optimization problem leads to a strategy of communication resource
allocation. A typical medical diagnostic problem on lung sounds is used, in combination with
a standard IEEE 802.11b WLAN network simulationmodel, to show the utility of this strategy
by finding the optimal resource allocation between compression ratios (and/or quantization
levels) and transmission rates.
WLAN standards allow freedom for laptops, computers on wheels, medical sensor nodes
and other medical equipment to efficiently roam through hospitals, but encounter potential
vulnerabilities of wireless beds, wireless medication robots, wireless I.V.s, wireless heart
monitoring & medication devices, and various other wireless medical technologies. There
are several common security threats to WLAN networks, such as eavesdropping, denial of
service, theft of service, etc., revealing weakness of the current security methods (RADIUS
servers, MAC filtering, etc.). Even proprietary systems have been shown to quickly succumb
to attacks. Control systems, which are the basis for medical equipment, also have weaknesses
that allow unauthorized control via these WLAN networks. As such, transmitting and
receiving a medical signal via an open medium like Wi-Fi is a critical concern. Interference
with these systems from congestion to outright manipulation of medical information can not
only put private medical information (PMI) at risk but also patients’ lives in peril. WiFi-based
telemedicine systems need to be immune from deny of service attacks, and provide service all
the time. Any kind of congestion is intolerable. Moreover, the privacy medical data should
not be intercepted and eavesdropped. As such, it is essential to have a multi-layered defense
starting with conventional security tactics to the implementation of more in-depth methods
like wireless covert channel signaling and wireless self protection systems. By increasing
wireless network security in this way, vulnerabilities of medical equipment and sensor nodes
can be significantly reduced to help ensure medical services are secure and available when
needed.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic system
settings for an integrated wireless-based medical information system. The main mathematics
models of the system modules are described. The trade-offs of compression errors and
compression ratios, quantization errors and quantization levels, transmission errors and
transmission rate as well as power levels are established in a stochastic framework. An
optimization problem for resource allocations to achieve overall error reduction is presented.
A standard IEEE 802.11b WLAN is used as a communication channel to illustrate the
usefulness of optimal resource allocations. An example of uniformly distributed signals
through a 1Mbps WLAN channel is employed to show the optimal choice of quantization
72 Telemedicine Techniques and Applicatio s
www.intechopen.com
Wireless Telemedicine System: An Accurate, Reliable and Secure Real-time Health Care 3
levels. Section 3 focuses on the integrated medical systems for diagnosis. A lung sound signal
is transmitted through a simulation model of WLAN-based medical information systems
in three different scenarios. The trade-offs among compression ratios, quantization levels,
transmission rates, and signal-to-noise ratios are demonstrated in a stochastic framework. The
overall error reduction can be achieved by optimizing information and resource allocations.
The impact of information processing and transmission errors on medical pattern recognition
and diagnosis accuracy is discussed. Session 4 discusses security weakness and security
enhancement methods in WLAN-based telemedicine system, and talks about the secure
roaming among different access points. Session 5 briefly summarizes the findings of the
chapter.
2. Integrated and wireless-based medical information systems
2.1 Mathematics models and error analysis of communication systems
A typical integrated system of information processing and wireless communications is shown
in Figure 1. The input sequence u = {uk : k = 1, . . . , L0} belongs to an input ensemble U. For
system analysis, the length L0 of u ∈ U is assumed to be fixed and known. This represents
the size of a signal or the number of samples in a fixed time interval T. Hence, f = L0/T will
be the data sampling rate. The probability of occurrence of a specific sequence u ∈ U will be
denoted by P{u}. The following typical components of communications will be considered
in this chapter, and their accuracy and complexity will be analyzed.
Fig. 1. System blocks
Discrete Cosine Transform
Several algorithms of transform data compression (TDC), such as fast Fourier transform (FFT),
discrete sine transform (DST), discrete cosine transform (DCT), 2D discrete cosine transform
(DCT2), etc., were compared in (29), showing that DCT has least compression errors in most
cases for medical signals. As a result, the DCT algorithm is used in our system modeling.
The input data block u = {uk : k = 1, . . . , L0} of medical signals passes a DCT block to
generate a coefficient sequence y = {yk : k = 1, . . . , L0}.
yk = D(u) = 2
L0−1
∑
n=0
anun cos
(
pikn
L0 − 1
)
, 0 ≤ k ≤ L0 − 1, (1)
where an =
{
1/2, n = 1 and L0 − 1;
2, 2 ≤ n ≤ L0 − 2.
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The DCT coefficient sequence y = {yk, k = 0, . . . , L0 − 1} belongs to an ensemble Y, and Y is
uniformly bounded by supy∈YY maxk=0,...,L0−1 |yk| ≤ ymax. The length of y ∈ Y is same as the
input sequence u.
Data Compression
To reduce data sizes, y is first compressed. In this chapter, we will use the following scheme
of truncation in data compression for concreteness of analysis, although the main tools of
analysis can be readily extended to other data compression schemes. For a given threshold ε,
ck = G(yk) =
{
yk, if |yk| > ε
0, if |yk| ≤ ε (2)
The length N of c depends on y with N ≤ L0, and hence is a random variable. The average
data compression ratio is defined as the expected value of N/L0
µ = E
(
N
L0
)
= ∑
y∈YY
N
L0
P(y).
Observe that for any given y ∈ Y, N is a monotone non-increasing function of ε. Namely,
the larger the threshold ε, the shorter the compressed sequence. As a result, µ is a monotone
non-increasing function of ε. This function will be denoted by µ = h(ε). h(ε) represents the
compressability function of the input ensemble Y. The main information we need for subsequent
complexity analysis, in terms of data compression, is this compressability function. Typical
compressability functions are shown in Figure 2.
1
0
İ
µ
umax
More compressable inputs
Less compressable inputs
Fig. 2. Typical compressability functions
Data Quantization
Before transmission, ck is first quantized. Suppose that the signal range [−ymax, ymax]
is divided into m equally spaced intervals of length δ = 2ymax/m. Quantization output
sequences take m possible values Q = {qj : j = 1, . . . ,m}, defined by
qj = −ymax + (j− 0.5)δ, j = 1, . . . ,m. (3)
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The quantization maps ck ∈ [−ymax, ymax] into its nearest element in Q. The complexity of
quantization is characterized by the size m of Q, or l = log2 m in bits. The quantization errors
are bounded by δ/2 = ymax/m = ymax/2l , hence is inversely proportional to m.
Data Transmission
The output of the quantization process is vk = M(ck), which will be transmitted through
a WLAN channel, whose output sequence will be denoted by wk. At a system level, a
DMC (discrete memoryless channel) channel can be modeled by its transmission conditional
probability matrix:
Φ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
p11 p12 · · · p1m
p21 p22 · · · p2m
... · · · ...
pm1 pm2 · · · pmm
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (4)
where pij = P{yk = qi|vk = qj}, that is, the conditional probability of receiving qi when qj is
transmitted.
It should be emphasized that this is a system-level representation of the communication
channel. The physical-level channel may vary. For instance, if the underlying modulation
scheme is a BPSK (bi-phase shift keying) modulation, then a binary memoryless channel
model may be used in representing the physical-level channel, with a probability matrix
Φ0 =
[
p011 p
0
12
p021 p
0
22
]
. (5)
In this case, vk, that takes m possible values, will be represented by a binary sequence of
length l = log2 m for transmission. The matrix Φ in (4) can be derived from Φ0 as the
l-tuple Cartesian product Φ = Φ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Φ0. Similar discussions (26) can be made for
DBPSK (differential bi-phase shift keying), DQPSK (differential quandary phase shift keying)
modulation, or other modulation schemes which are used in IEEE 802.11b WLAN.
Inverse Discrete Cosine Transform
The received sequence w = {wk : k = 0, . . . , N − 1} of the wireless channel are processed
through the inverse cosine transform block to recover the original time-domain signal
sequence u˜ = {u˜k : k = 0, . . . , N − 1}.
u˜k = I(y˜) =
1
N − 1
N−1
∑
n=0
an y˜n cos
(
pikn
N − 1
)
, 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1, (6)
where an =
{
1/2, n = 0 and N − 1;
2, 2 ≤ n ≤ N − 2.
2.2 Relations between errors and complexity: Analysis and optimization
2.2.1 Information accuracy and complexity
Assumption A: DCT and IDCT do not involve errors.
Under assumption A, only data compression, quantization, and communications introduce
errors in information representation and transmission. The sizes of the errors depend on
certain complexity measures of the operations. In particular, data compression introduces
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compression errors that increase when the compression ratio µ decreases. Quantization errors
increase when the quantization complexity m decreases. Communication errors increase
when the signal/noise ratio decreases, or the transmission rate increases, or the assigned
bandwidth decreases. We shall start with a more precise description of these errors.
• Compression Errors and Compression Ratios
Assume that yk takes values in [−ymax, ymax] with a probability density fc(x) that is an
even function and the sequence {yk} is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
The compression error eck = yk − ck = yk − G(yk) has mean
Eeck =
∫ ymax
−ymax
(x − G(x)) fc(x)dx =
∫ ε
−ε
x fc(x)dx = 0,
and variance
σ2c = E(e
c
k)
2 =
∫ ymax
−ymax
(x − G(x))2 fc(x)dx =
∫ ε
−ε
x2 fc(x)dx = Sc(ε).
It follows that the variance is
σ2c = E(e
c
k)
2 =
∫ ymax
−ymax
(x − G(x))2 1
2ymax
dx =
∫ ε
−ε
x2
1
2ymax
dx =
2ε3
3
1
2ymax
=
ε3
3ymax
.
Combining the relationship between σ2c and ε with the compressability function µ = h(ε),
assuming h(·) is invertible in the range [0, ymax], we have a complexity relationship
σ2c = Sc(ε) = Sc(h
−1(µ)) := λc(µ). (7)
• Quantization Errors and Complexity
The quantization error e
q
k = ck − M(ck) is bounded by |e
q
k| ≤ δ/2. Suppose that e
q
k is i.i.d.
with a density function fq(x) that is an even function on [−δ/2, δ/2] (31). Then the mean
and variance of e
q
k can be derived as E(e
q
k) = 0 and
σ2q = E(e
q
k)
2 =
∫ δ/2
−δ/2
x2 fq(x)dx = Sq(δ) = Sq(2ymax/m) := λq(m), (8)
noting that δ = 2ymax/m. The function σ2q = λq(m) defines the complexity relationship for
quantization. For example, if e
q
k is uniformly distributed, then fq(x) = 1/δ and
σ2q =
∫ δ/2
−δ/2
x2
δ
dx =
δ2
12
=
y2max
3m2
=
y2max
3
2−2l .
• Transmission Errors and Communication Power and Bandwidth
The impact of signal power and bandwidth on the transmission channels is typically
summarized in the normalized signal-to-noise ratio Es/N0, where Es is energy per
symbol and N0 is average noise power per unit bandwidth. This parameter defines the
communication complexity or resource requirements since signal power and bandwidth
are the key resources in a communication system. For a given physical level modulation,
the transmission matrix Φ defined in (4) depends on Es/N0 and may be expressed as
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Φ(Es/N0). Intuitively, the larger the signal-to-noise ratio Es/N0 is, the closer the matrix Φ
is to the identity matrix.
To understand the transmission errors, we note that if vk = qj occurs with probability pj =
P{qj} and qj is transmitted, then the output ŷk may take any values in Q with probability
P{ŷk = qi|vk = qj} = pij and error etk = qj − qi. It follows that the conditional mean
squares error E[(etk)
2|qj] = ∑mi=1(qj − qi)2pij. Consequently, the overall mean squares error
is E[(etk)
2] = ∑mj=1 ∑
m
i=1(qj − qi)2pij pj. The last quantity depends on the input probability
distribution p = {p1, . . . , pm : pj ≥ 0 and p1 + · · · + pm = 1}. A characterizing quantity
for the transmission error is the worst-case mean squares error
sup
p
E[(etk)
2] = sup
p
m
∑
j=1
m
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2pij pj ≤ max
j=1,2,..m
m
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2pij := σ2t . (9)
It is noted that since Φ is a function of signal-to-noise ratio Es/N0 and transmission rate
which is determined by compression ratio µ and quantization level m, so is σ2t . This
dependence will be denoted by
σ2t = λt(Es/N0, µ,m). (10)
For some typical communication modulation schemes, we will derive explicit expressions
for λt(Es/N0, µ,m) in subsequent sections.
2.2.2 Optimal resource allocations
Assumption B: Compression errors, quantization errors and transmission errors are
independent.
Under assumption B, the overall errors in the integrated information processing and
communication system can be derived as follows:
ek = yk − ŷk = yk − ck + ck − vk + vk − ŷk = eck + eqk + etk,
where eck is compression error, e
q
k is quantization error (31), and e
t
k is transmission error. Hence,
under assumption B, and under the worst-case input distributions, the mean squares error is
σ2 = sup
p
Ee2k = E(e
c
k)
2 + E(e
q
k)
2 + E(etk)
2 = σ2c + σ
2
q + σ
2
t . (11)
where σ2c , σ
2
q , and σ
2
t is mean square errors for compression, quantization and transmission
respectively. By substituting the complexity relationships (7), (8), and (10) into this expression,
we obtain an overall complexity function
σ2 = λ
(
µ,m,
Es
N0
)
= λc(µ) + λq(m) + λt
(
Es
N0
, µ,m
)
. (12)
For a given communication resource, compression ratio µ and quantization level in bits
logm2 are inversely proportional to each other for a particular transmission rate, namely
µ ∗ logm2 = C, and C is determined by the assigned channel bandwidth and the selected
modulation method. In order to minimize the overall mean squares error, we shall minimize
7ir less Tel medici e Syst m: An Accur e, Reliable and Secure Real-time Health Care
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the following performance index:
min
µ,m
[
λ
(
µ,m,
Es
N0
)]
= min
m
[
λc
(
C
logm2
)
+ λq(m) + λt
(
Es
N0
,
C
logm2
,m
)]
. (13)
2.3 Mathematical analysis of WLAN-based medical information systems
2.3.1 Typical modulation schemes and channel models
In digital communication systems, popular modulation schemes include phase shift keying
(PSK), frequency shift keying (FSK), amplitude shift keying (ASK), continuous phase
modulation (CPM), and some hybrid combinations such as quadrature amplitudemodulation
(QAM). For every modulation scheme there are several sub-modulation methods, for
example, PSK includes bi-phase shift keying (BPSK), quadri-phase shift keying (QPSK),
multiple phase shift keying (MPSK), differential PSK (DPSK), etc.
Suppose that a memoryless symmetric binary channel transmits xk = a > 0 for the bit vk = 1
and xk = −a for the bit vk = 0. The output of the channel is wk = xk + dk, where dk is the
additive channel noise. The decoding scheme is that ŷk = 1 if wk ≥ 0, and ŷk = 0 if wk < 0.
dk is assumed to be i.i.d., zero mean, and has finite second moments. The probability density
function of d1 is fd(x), which is symmetric to the origin. The accumulative probability
distribution is denoted by F(x). Consequently, the probabilities of transmission errors can
be derived as
P{ŷk = 0|vk = 1}= P{wk < 0|xk = a} = P{dk < −a} =
∫ −a
−∞
fd(x)dx = F(−a) := pe.
P{ŷk = 1|vk = 0}= P{wk ≥ 0|xk = −a} = P{dk ≥ a} =
∫ ∞
a
fd(x)dx = F(a) := pe.
since fd(x) is symmetric.
For example, if the disturbance is Gaussian distributed with variance σ2, its probability
density function is
fd(x) =
1√
2piσ
e−x
2/σ2 . (14)
It follows that pe =
∫ ∞
a fd(x)dx = Q(a/σ) where Q(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x e
−τ2/2dτ is called the
complementary error function.
In a typical BPSK modulation (11), σ =
√
N0
2Tb
, where Tb =
1
R and R is the transmission rate.
In this case,
pe = Q(a/σ) = Q
(
a/
√
N0
2Tb
)
.
For BPSK energy per symbol Es = a
2Tb, and symbol error probability is
pe = Q
(√
2Es
N0
)
. (15)
Consequently, the probability transition matrix Φ in (5) under BPSK modulation is Φ =[
1− pe pe
pe 1− pe
]
.
78 Telemedicine Techniques and Applicatio s
www.intechopen.com
Wireless Telemedicine System: An Accurate, Reliable and Secure Real-time Health Care 9
Similarly, the symbol error probability for differential binary PSK (DBPSK) modulation is (23)
pe =
1
2
exp
(
− Es
N0
)
. (16)
The symbol error probability for M-ary PSK (MPSK) modulation is
pe ≈ 2Q
(√
2Es
No
sin
( pi
M
))
, (17)
and the symbol error probability for M-ary DPSK (DMPSK) modulation is (15)
pe ≈ 2Q
(√
2Es
No
sin
(
pi√
2M
))
, (18)
where M is is the size of symbol set.
2.3.2 Transmission errors of WLAN(802.11b) integrated systems
To simplify our analysis we use IEEE 802.11b WLAN as a typical communication environment
(802.11a, 802.11g or 802.11n will have similar results). There are four transmission rates,
1Mbps, 2Mbps, 5.5Mbps and 11Mbps, in IEEE 802.11b WLAN. Different transmission rates
use different modulation methods (38). When the transmission rate equals 1Mbps, DBPSK
modulation and DSSS (direct-sequence spread spectrum) are used. When the transmission
rate equals 2Mbps, DQPSK (differential quandary PSK) modulation and DSSS are used. When
the transmission rate equals 5.5Mbps and 11Mbps, combined PSK and CCK (complementary
code keying) are used. Precise evaluation of symbol errors of each transmission rate is
a complex problem. Here we analyze the transmission errors of DBPSK and DQPSK
modulations as examples.
1. System Analysis under DBPSK Modulation
The probability transition matrix Φ0 in (5) under DBPSK modulation is similar to that
under BPSK modulation, and pe is given in (16), then
Φ0 =
[
1− pe pe
pe 1− pe
]
.
If inputs have only two possible values, i.e. the quantization level m is 2, then matrices Φ
and Φ0 are equal, and by (9)
σ2t = sup
p1,p2≥0
p1+p2=1
2
∑
j=1
2
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2pij pj = (q2 − q1)2pe(p1 + p2) = (q2 − q1)2pe.
Since p12 = p21 = pe and p1 + p2 = 1, by (3), σ
2
t = (q2 − q1)2pe = δ2pe. In general,
the corresponding elements of the probability transition matrix Φ in (4) under DBPSK
modulation is pij = (pe)
α(1 − pe)(l−α), i, j = 1, 2, ..,m, where l is the number of bits per
code, and α is the number of error bits. As a result, the mean squares errors of transmission
7ir less Tel medici e Syst m: An Accur e, Reliable and Secure Real-time Health Care
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(9) is
σ2t= sup
p1,...,pm≥0
p1+...+pm=1
m
∑
j=1
m
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2pij pj
= sup
p1,...,pm≥0
p1+...+pm=1
m
∑
j=1
m
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2(pe)α(1− pe)(l−α)pj
= max
j=1,..,m
m
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2(pe)α(1− pe)(l−α).
2. System Analysis under DQPSK Modulation
The probability transition matrix Φ0 in (5) under DQPSK modulation now becomes a 4
× 4 matrix. We have
Φ0 =
⎡⎢⎢⎣
1− 2pe − p′e pe p′e pe
pe 1− 2pe − p′e pe p′e
p′e pe 1− 2pe − p′e pe
pe p
′
e pe 1− 2pe − p′e
⎤⎥⎥⎦ .
By equation (18)
pe ≈ 2Q
(√
2Es
No
sin
(
pi
4
√
2
))
.
For DQPSK modulation p′e ≈ p2e , and the transmission error σ2t in equation (9) is
σ2t= sup
p1,...,p4≥0
p1+...+p4=1
4
∑
j=1
4
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2pij pj
= max
j=1,..,4
4
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2pij
= (q2 − q1)2pe + (q3 − q1)2p′e + (q4 − q1)2pe
= 10δ2pe + 4δ
2p′e.
3. An Illustrative Example: Uniformly Distributed Signals through 1Mbps Rate WLAN
Channel (DBPSK Modulation)
Suppose a signal is transmitted through a WLAN channel using 1Mbps transmission rate
(DBPSK modulation). Assume the input signal vk is uniformly distributed from 1 to m,
where m is quantization level. Then we have pj =
1
m , for j = 1, ...,m. A quantized value
needs l = log2m bits to represent, and transmission probability matrix Φ of the WLAN
channel is same as matrix (4) with pij = P{yk = qi|vk = qj} = (pe)α(1− pe)(l−α) where α
is the number of error bits. If no error occurs after passing through a wireless channel,
then yk = vk, pij = (1 − pe)l , and
m
∑
i=1
pij = 1. Normally when a quantized value is
transmitted through the WLAN channel, the possibility of error transmission is much less
than the possibility of error-free transmission, namely, pe << 1− pe. Hence, for simplicity
we assume that all error possibility for a particular input is pij =
1−(1−pe)l
m−1 for any i 
= j.
80 Telemedicine Techniques and Applicatio s
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When quantization level is m or bits per value are l in our case, pij is
pij =
{
(1− pe)l if qi = qj;
1−(1−pe)l
m−1 if qi 
= qj.
The probability matrix (4) becomes
Φ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1− pe)l 1−(1−pe)
l
m−1 · · · 1−(1−pe)
l
m−1
1−(1−pe)l
m−1
1−(1−pe)l
m−1 (1− pe)l · · · 1−(1−pe)
l
m−1
1−(1−pe)l
m−1
... · · ·
...
1−(1−pe)l
m−1
1−(1−pe)l
m−1 · · · 1−(1−pe)
l
m−1 (1− pe)l
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
The transmission error σ2t of (9) is
σ2t= sup
p1,...,pm≥0
p1+...+pm=1
m
∑
j=1
m
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2pij pj
=
1− (1− pe)l
(m− 1)m
m
∑
j=1
m
∑
i=1
(qj − qi)2
=
[
1− (1− pe)l
(m − 1)m
]
δ2
m
∑
j=1
m
∑
i=1
(j− i)2
=
[
1− (1− pe)l
(m − 1)m δ
2
] ⎡⎣2L m∑
i=1
i2 − 2
(
m
∑
i=1
i
)2⎤⎦
=
[
1− (1− pe)l
(m − 1) δ
2
] [
m(m + 1)(2m + 1)
3
− m(m + 1)
2
2
]
= δ2
[
1− (1− pe)l
] [2l(2l + 1)
6
]
,
where pe equals
1
2
exp
(
− Es
N0
)
by equation (16).
To get a general equation of overall error in the studied system, we do not compress the
signal here, since as shown in Figure 2, compression ratio µ and compression error σ2c are
highly specific to the input signals. The compression ratio will vary greatly for different
signals with a given threshold ε. Consequently, the overall error in equation (11) for signal
yk is:
σ2 = E[ek − E(ek)]2 = σ2q + σ2t =
y2max
22l
[
1
3
+ 4
(
1− (1− pe)l
)(2l(2l + 1)
6
)]
.
Figure 3 shows the mathematic results for a signal with ymax = 1. For a given uniformly
distributed signal yk there is an optimized value l to minimize the overall error when
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Fig. 3. Optimized quantization levels for Es/No=2, 4, 6, 8, 10
the signals are transmitted through a wireless channel. The optimized values vary with
different signal-to-noise ratios.
3. Wireless-based medical information processing: Information accuracy and
diagnosis reliability
3.1 WLAN-based medical information system simulation model
An integrated medical information processing and WLAN system is simulated in a MATLAB
environment. Similar to themathematical model in Figure 1, it includes six blocks: DCT block,
data compression block, transmitter block (quantizer is included inside) (18), WLAN channel
block, receiver block (18), and IDCT block.
The compressedDCT coefficients is embedded into IEEE 802.11bWLANphysical layer frames
by adding PLCP (physical layer convergence protocol) preamble and header, modulation and
spreading, upsampling and pulse shaping, etc. Packet sizes (1 to 8191 bytes) and preambles
can be selected manually. The thermal noise characteristics (additive,white,and Gaussian) are
used to model the noise in most wireless systems (13; 23). We simulated the WLAN channel
using a memoryless symmetric binary AWGN (add white Gaussian noise) channel. Different
channel (1 to 11), different signal-to-noise ratio (-10db to 20 db) and different transmission
rates (1Mbps, 2Mbps, 5.5Mbps, and 11Mbps) can be selected. At receiver side, the 802.11b
physical layer frames are processed by demodulation and despreading, deframing, removing
PLCP preamble and header, etc., to recover the input DCT coefficients from the transmitter,
and further through the IDCT block to retrieve the original time-domain medical signals.
1. Simulation Scenario 1
Compression ratios and compression errors are highly specific to the input medical signals.
As a result, it is difficult to get a general mathematics equation of compression errors.
However, we can study compression effects using our simulation models. For simulation
parameters, we select the signal-to-noise ratios to be sufficiently large to avoid errors
involved with the WLAN channel. Figure 4 shows simulation results with compression
ratio µ = 0.2 (threshold ε = 0.0141). It compares the original time-domain signal and
DCT coefficients with the received DCT coefficients and recovered signals, and shows the
absolute errors in the fifth sub-figure. The errors in this scenario are mainly introduced
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through compression (note: in this scenario we set the quantization level to 216, and
the resulting quantization errors are much smaller than the compression errors). We use
the percentage RMS difference (PRD), which is calculated as in (19), to evaluate signal
distortion. The PRD for the simulated lung sound signal is 2.59% when the compression
ratio equals 0.2.
PRD(%) =
√√√√√√√√
n
∑
i=1
[xorg(i)− xrec(i)]2
n
∑
i=1
[xorg(i)]
2
× 100. (19)
Fig. 4. Lung sound signal compression
For the lung sounds of Figure 4, the simulation results of PRD relationship to the
compression ratio are plotted in Figure 5. The signal distortion is a monotone,
non-increasing function of the compression ratio.
2. Simulation Scenario 2
Equation (12) shows that the overall complexity is a function of the signal-to-noise ratio.
To find the relationship of PRD to Es/No, we transmit the lung sound signal through four
WLAN channels (1Mbps, 2Mbps, 5.5Mbps, 11Mbps) with different signal-to-noise ratios.
Figure 6 shows the results. In general, the larger the signal-to-noise ratio is, the less the
transmission error is. If Es/N0 is larger than 12 dB, there is no transmission error on
any WLAN channel. If Es/N0 is smaller than 2 dB, 1Mbps becomes the only reasonable
transmission rate. When the environment is noisy, to keep the same PRD value, we must
increase the signal strength or transmit the signal at a low transmission rate. This involves
an optimization problem between transmission power and transmission rate.
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Fig. 5. PRD to compression ratio
Fig. 6. PRD to Es/No using different WLAN transmission rate
3. Simulation Scenario 3
In this scenario, we study the trade-off between compression ratios (and/or quantization
levels) and transmission rates in WLAN under different signal-to-noise ratios.
The more the compression ratio is (and/or the less the quantization levels are), the
less the data size becomes. So the medical signal can be transmitted at a slower
transmission rate with a higher compression error (and/or higher quantization error)
and lower transmission error. There is an optimal point to minimize the overall error.
Figure 7 shows the simulation results in different signal-to-noise ratios with a fixed
quantization level (216). There is an optimized compression rate for a given signal-to-noise
ratio with a fixed quantization level. For example, when Es/No is 10db, the optimal
compression ratio is about 40% with very small PRD. When Es/No is 2db, the optimal
compression ratio is about 10% with PRD around 16%. Optimizing medical data and
wireless resources is important for an integrated medical information processing and
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Fig. 7. PRD to compression ratio in different Es/No environment
communication system. From the figures, we notice that a small difference in compression
ratio for a fix quantization level can result in a large difference in overall errors.
3.2 Medical pattern recognition and diagnosis reliability
3.2.1 Impact of information processing and transmission errors on lung sound diagnosis
Shown in the previous section, wireless transferred lung sound may be contaminated by
data processing errors and/or transmission errors. If the overall errors are so severe as to
alter the lung sound waveforms and patterns significantly, the lung sounds may no longer
be suitable for diagnosis. Here we use an example of wheeze detection to illustrate the
impact of overall errors on lung sound pattern recognition and diagnosis. Lung sounds were
collected from a sophisticated human patient simulator under normal and wheeze conditions.
Low, medium and high random noises were added to lung sounds to generate three sets of
simulated overall errors. Several essential lung sound parameters were derived from lung
sound data, such as FCe (exhale peaking frequency), PSe (exhale frequency bandwidth, i.e.,
exhale 90% frequency bandwidth that contains 90% of total power,), Pe (exhale total power),
Ti (inhale length), Si (inhale strength: RMS values), Te (exhale length), Se (exhale strength:
RMS values), T (breath cycle length), etc., and diagnosis regions were designated from one or
several parameters. Figure 8 illustrates the lung sound frequency domain parameter points
(X-axle: exhale peaking frequency; Y-axle: exhale frequency bandwidth) under low, medium
and high levels of overall error conditions respectively. Under the low error level, parameter
points are clustered for both normal breath and wheeze, indicating a potential in achieving
a high level of confidence in distinguishing wheeze from normal patterns. When the lung
sound is corrupted by medium level errors, the parameter patterns are intervened, leading
to a difficult pattern recognition problem. When errors are further increased to a high level,
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the problem becomes even worse, and the parameter points of wheeze start to drift out of the
wheeze region towards the normal region. This pattern shifting by noise artifacts significantly
reduces diagnosis accuracy.
From the figure we can see that when lung sound is interfered by errors to some levels, the
lung sound patterns have larger deviations and have a pattern shifting as well. Reduction
of noise artifacts and signal processing errors is of essential relevance in medical diagnosis
and highlights the issues of optimal utility of communication resources in medical diagnosis
problems.
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Fig. 8. Noise impact on normal lung sound and wheeze
3.2.2 Impact of noise on sound characteristics
To find the lung sound diagnosis pattern after passing the wireless telemedicine system we
transmitted both normal and wheeze lung sound through the system. As we illustrated before
noise will impact on lung sound patterns. Figure 9(a) shows a typical normal breathing
sound and figure 9(b) shows an expirational wheeze (these are from the Human Patient
Simulator, i.e. HPS, which was set as a 50 year old truck driver with normal condition and
with wheeze disease respectively) (33–35). When collecting the data, we used a ventilation
machine to control the breath and the environment noise was set as low as possible. The
top figures are the raw data measured directly from the HPS. Since the existence of some
low-frequency noise such as skin-scraping noises, chest movement noises, etc., the breathing
patterns are not obvious. We used a high-pass filter to eliminate the noise under 200 Hz. After
filtering, the difference between normal and wheeze lung sound can be clearly seen from
their time domain waveforms. In the frequency domain analysis, the wheeze can be further
characterized by a substantial narrowing of spectrum, shifting of center frequency (towards
low pitch in this example), etc.. For this example, sounds are obviously very clean with
minimum noise corruption. Lung Sound patterns are significantly alteredwhen noise artifacts
are present. Figure 9(c) shows the corruptedwheeze signal, both in its time-domainwaveform
and frequency-domain spectrum. It is clear that in a noisy environment, the characteristics of
a wheeze are distorted to the point that it is no longer possible to recognize sound patterns.
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Fig. 9. A normal sound, a wheeze, and noise impact on sound patterns
3.2.3 Lung sound diagnosis after passing the wireless telemedicine systems
We shall reduce the noise by adaptive noise cancelation (ANC) method, see (33–35) for the
details of ANCmethod, and use frequency domain characteristics of exhale signal to show the
pattern of lung sound signals. Previous section told us that there is an optimized compression
ratio or quantization level (in bits) for a particular signal-to-noise ratio of communication
channel. Here we select same simulation module in section 5, and to simplified the analysis
we do not compress the signal. Simulation result shows the optimal quantization level is 28.
After we received the lung sound signal, we plotted the lung sound frequency domain
parameter points in a x(peak frequency)-y(frequency bandwidth) plane. Figure 10 illustrates
the lung sound diagnosis pattern. The top figure shows the points of original lung sound
signal, the meddle figure show the points of lung sound signal passing the WLAN-based
telemedicine systemwhen the quantization level is 28 and the signal to noise ratio is 10dB, and
bottom one shows points of received lung sound signal after ANC process. To make clear we
drew a 2σ confidence region both for normal and wheeze lung sound extracted parameters.
From the figures we can see that after signals are transmitted through the system, the wheeze
pattern data points are no longer in the wheeze region due to the quantization errors and
transmission errors, and they mix with normal region, which makes the diagnosis incorrect.
Fortunately, after ANC process the wheeze pattern data points are separated from normal
region again, which correct the diagnosis.
ANC method separates the wheeze pattern region from normal pattern region. And the
bottom one of figure 10 shows that there is distance between the normal 2σ confidence region
and the wheeze 2σ confidence region. This comes out a problem: is it possible to reduce
original lung sound signal data further while still make correct diagnosis ? The answer is:
Yes. Figure 11 shows the result. Here quantization level is not 28 but 24 (The length of original
lung sound data becomes half), and the other parameters of the system are kept same. We
can see from bottom one of figure 11 that after noise cancellation the wheeze pattern region
can still be separate from normal pattern region, however the distance of the two lung sound
pattern region becomes shorter. So we can transmit less lung sound data than optimal one
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Fig. 10. Lung sound pattern when quantization level is 28
while can still distinguish wheeze lung sound to normal lung sound at receiver side, but the
probability of error diagnosis will increase. There is a trade-off between them.
4. Security impacts of wireless channels
4.1 Weakness in wireless-based telemedicine systems
As wireless systems use an open medium, all the data transmitted or received over a wireless
system like WLAN is susceptible to attacks from both passive eavesdropping and active
interfering. There are several main common security threats in WLAN networks such as
eavesdropping, deny of service, theft of service, etc. For example, an attacker can use some
utilities like NetStumbler (47) to monitor all active access points in the area, and start Ethereal
(48) to look for additional information. The attacker can then capture the packets with Airsnort
(49), and crack the WEP key. With WEP key, an attacker can further sniff layer 3-7 packets.
Portable medical equipment and sensors based on SCADA technology, increasingly utilize
WiFi networks and thus are vulnerable to a combinedwireless / SCADA attack. Such SCADA
attacks would includeUnauthorized Command Execution, SCADADenial of Service, SCADA
Man-in-the-Middle, Replay, and Malicious Service Commands. A focus on protection of the
WiFi network is an essential step in reducing these vulnerabilities (14). As such security
becomes one of the most pressing and challenging problems faced by WLAN networks (28).
When a telemedicine system uses WLAN to transmit or receive medical signal, security
becomes extremely important. Security features such as authentication and encryption are
always considered, and the goal is to make WLAN traffic as secure as wired traffic (37).
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Fig. 11. Lung sound pattern when quantization level is 24
Bluetooth is another widely usedwireless network standard. Though the security of Bluetooth
is enhanced, malicious nodes can still use Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to prevent victims
going through Bluetooth LAN access points.
4.2 Enhancement of WiFi security using 802.11i standard
WiFi alliance (52) defined two authentication standards i.e., WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access)
and WPA2. WPA was based on IEEE 802.11i standard (40), and used to replace WEP
(Wired Equivalent Privacy). One major improvement in WPA is the TKIP (Temporal Key
Integrity Protocol) which dynamically changes encryption keys when the WiFi is used. TKIP
is combined with the much larger initialization vector to provide greatly improved protection
from attacks against WEP. Moreover, WPA also provides MIC (Message Integrity Code) to
greatly improve payload integrity. WPA2 is the advanced version ofWPAwhich implemented
the full mandatory parts of 802.11i. In addition to the TKIP and MIC, it also implements a
new AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) based algorithm and CCMP (Counter Mode with
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol) to enhance the security.
There are two modes for both WPA and WPA2: enterprise and personal. Enterprise WPA
and WPA2 use IEEE 802.1X protocol (41), which is based on EAP (Extensible Authentication
Protocol), and distributes different keys to each user through RADIUS authentication server.
Figure 12 shows the authentication procedures (50). When an 802.11 mobile node (supplicant)
tries to connect to the WLAN network, the access point will sent out EAP-Request identity
packet, and the mobile node will response with the EAP-response packet that will be
forwarded to the RADIUS server. The authentication server then begins the authentication
procedures including sending out challenge and verifying challenge response. If mobile
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node passes the authentication, RADIUS will accept the request, and allow normal traffic.
Otherwise, RADIUS will reject the request and block all non-EAP traffic.
Fig. 12. EAP authentication
Personal WPA and WPA2 do not use RADIUS server to authenticate but utilize less scalable
Pre-shared Key (PSK). In PSK mode, each mobile node is given the same passphrase.
4.3 Enhancement of security at home or residential areas
In most personal and residential areas where RADIUS is not available, the WLAN medical
sensor nodes will use the PSK mode for both WPA and WPA2. Instead of using a complex
and expensive authentication server, each user must enter a passphrase (up to 63 ASCII
characters or 64 hexadecimal digits) to access the network. When using the ASCII characters,
a hash function reduces it from 504 bits (63 characters × 8 bits/character) to 256 bits. For the
PSK mode, the security level depends on the strength and secrecy of the passphrase, and is
vulnerable to some attacks such as password cracking attacks, brute force attack, etc. Aircrack
is one tool used to retrieve WPA and WPA2 PSK keys (44).
There are several ways to strengthen the PSK mode:
• Generate passphrases at their discretion, and pre-store on the medical sensor node to avoid
re-entry;
• Employ a PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function) key derivation function;
• Bypass weak passphrase, and only allow passphrase using 40 characters or more.
Alternatively, mobile sensor nodes and access points can choose some privately defined
security protocols to enhance the security level in residential areas. There are several such
protocols, such as WAPI (WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure) (51). People
may also implement high complexity authentication protocols based on their research and
preference. However, as those methods are not standardized, people need to have the access
to change the firmware of access points. Moreover, while private protocols are a good step,
they do not ensure security. A prime example is the Lightweight Extensible Authentication
Protocol (LEAP) developed by Cisco Systems which blocks all access until the client provides
authentication credentials before a session key and access to the network is granted. ASLEAP
is a tool to exploit LEAP. "Within months, some helpful person invested their time into
generating a cracker tool. Publicizing the threat was a service to everyone, but I leave it as
an exercise for readers to determine what satisfaction is obtained by the authors of tools that
turn threat into reality and lay waste to millions of dollars of investments (45)."
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Fig. 13. Secure Fast Roaming Packet Streams
4.4 Secure session based fast roaming
WiFi-based telemedicine networks will normally comprise multiple access points in
healthcare centers or at home to have full coverage. WiFimedical sensor nodes can roam freely
between access points once they have been authenticated and associated to the telemedicine
network, which means a sensor node can move in and out of coverage of different access
points, and always associates with the strongest RF signal as it moves across theWiFi network.
When a sensor node starts a roaming procedure, it will disassociate from the current access
point and subsequently associate with the desired access point without losing connection and
current communication session. And no new authentication is needed when a sensor node
swap the access points. To do this, the WiFi sensor node will still keep catching neighbor
access points’ information from their beacon packets and/or probe response packets when it
associates an access point. A roaming process will be triggeredwhen one or more of following
conditions meets (30):
1. RSSI (receive signal strength indication) from current access point is too low;
2. RSSI difference between neighbor access point and current access point is larger then
threshold;
3. Excessive interface or noise for current access point;
4. Excessive retries when re-associates to access point;
5. Current access point has insufficient capacity;
6. Other transmission error exceed threshold; etc.
Medical sensor nodes must complete roaming and be able to pass data within 100-200
milliseconds when it decides to roam to a new access point (36). Figure 13 shows detailed
roaming procedures when a WiFi mobile node moves from the coverage of one access point
to another.
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4.5 Problems with standard wireless security tactics
While it is essential to implement standard security methods, one needs to realize that
individually each method is not enough. For example, disabling SSID broadcasting has no
impact on network traffic. This is one layer of defense for a wireless network. A determined
hacker tools like Kismet will probe wireless networks and by default the WAP responds with
a message that contains its SSID. MAC filtering attempts to restrict access to known devices;
but tools like Macshift (windows) and Macchanger (Linux) allow spoofing of MAC addresses
to work around this defense.
Multiple layers of defense and complex defenses are the best methods of promoting security.
4.6 Wireless SCADA system concerns
In addition to the computers, laptops, and handheld devices, medical environments are
increasingly integratingmedical equipment and sensors into their wireless networks. Wireless
smart beds automate patient charting, wireless robots bring pills to patients, wireless smart
intravenous (I.V.) pumps deliver medication into patients (16), wireless heart monitoring
tracks patients’ heart health and adjusts medication accordingly (1), and various other
wireless medical technologies are becoming common place (2; 8; 25; 39). Such medical
equipment and sensors are supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
In July 2010, vulnerabilities of SCADA systems hit the mainstream news with the discovery
of the Stuxnet trojan. The Stuxnet trojan attacked Siemens PLCs, using a default password
hard-coded in the Siemens Simatric WinCC software to access the SCADAMS SQL database.
Stuxnet readily infiltrated systems that were NOT directly connected to the internet. Even
before Stuxnet the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the Department
of Energy realized the serious nature of SCADA vulnerabilities and developed 21 steps to
improve the security of SCADA systems (42). DoD initiated a series of SCADA Security
Workshops, which include a plugfest for live vulnerability testing of SCADA systems (43).
There have been a number of examples of “war driving” to attack SCADA systems. The
Maroochy Shire Sewage Spill in 2000, where a disgruntled employee accessedwireless sewage
pumping stations, released millions of liters of raw sewage into nearby rivers and parks.
SCADA attacks can take the form of unauthorized command execution, SCADA denial of
service, SCADA man-in-the-middle, replay attacks, and malicious service commands.
With these examples in mind, one can easily envision wireless attacks aimed at wireless
medical equipment and sensors. Patient charting could be manipulated. Medication dosage
could be changed. Medical “war driving” would be localized, but trojans aimed at specific
wireless medical equipment could impact large numbers of patients across the nation or even
across the globe. The idea of deploying these wireless tools is to reduce errors by enabling
doctors and nurses to input critical data on the spot and offer immediate and “reliable” access
to patient information and records. Yet pursuit of this worthy goal via wireless and SCADA
technologies introduces new and frightening vulnerabilities. There are some basic steps that
can be applied to wireless medical equipment and sensors:
• Identify all wireless connections.
• Perform risk assessments and audits.
• Establish red teams.
• Limit access by MAC address.
• Disable SSID broadcasting.
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• Lock down backdoors and change default passwords
• Disconnect unnecessary wireless connections
• Appropriately configure firewall
• Implement manufactures security features.
Some more in-depth security tactics would be:
• Install a wireless IDS (46)
• Encrypt bluetooth channels (a method which could be revised for any WiFi traffic)
• Utilize anomaly-based behavior analysis of wireless network traffic (4)
4.7 Advanced wireless security protection methods
This section will discuss a scheme to successfully trace attacking paths from malicious nodes
as well as segregate and protect systems from thesemalicious nodes (3). It can be implemented
in both WLAN (WiFi) and WPAN (Bluetooth, Zigbee). Another method mentioned in this
section are Wireless Self Protection Systems. In combination with standard security methods,
these methods build a multilayer defense for wireless security.
4.7.1 Wireless covert channel signaling
Denial of service (DoS) attacks is one of active interfering attacks using which an attacker can
cause congestion in WLAN or WPAN network either by generating an excessive amount of
traffic itself, or by making other nodes generate excessive amounts of traffic. Besides common
DoS attacks incurred in wired networks which transmit falsified route updates or reduces
the TTL (time-to-live) field in the IP header, etc., WLAN or WPAN networks have their own
unique DoS attacks. For example, an attacker can cause a particular node to continuously relay
dump data to use up the battery of that node. DoS attack is a serious problem for WLAN or
WPANnetworks formedical applications, especiallywhen the they networks are connected to
a scatternet or a local area network. In this case, becausemalicious nodes fromanywhere in the
scatternet or anywhere in the LAN can launch the DoS attacks, they can block time-essential or
even life-threatening information from being sent through the networks or disable the WLAN
or WPAN networks. Covert channel signalling can be used to trace DoS attack paths back to
the malicious nodes:
Establish Cover Channels
An end-to-end authentication may prevent DoS attacks from being launched, however if
two nodes collude, DoS attacks are still quite feasible (10). To detect malicious nodes in a
WLAN or WPAN network, schemes of covert channels have been designed (3; 21), which are
implemented in baseband layer, logical link control layer, and service discovery layer. Those
covert channels may inject probabilistically device information through the access points, and
based on the injected information the DoS victims may reconstruct the complete path from
the packets.
Trace Back with Covert Channels
When tracking back function is enabled, the WLAN or WPAN access points write their MAC
addresses (each has 48 bits) or IP addresses (each has 32 bits for IPv4 or 48 bits for IPv6)
into the designed covert channel of packet headers probabilistically (3; 20). When the victim
receives the packets, necessary information can be extracted from the covert channels of those
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packets. To make the tracing back more accurate and robust, access points need to insert
the checksum into the packets header fragments. Checksum function should be random and
unpredictable to the attacker. A random hash function, for example, can be used (9).
Reconstruct Attack Paths
When the victim node receives a set of packets which were marked by access points with
a certain probability, it extracts the embedded bits from the covert channel. After removes
the duplicates, it then sorts the blocks that have the same checksum. By combining all the
fragments, the victim will recover the original address chain information (3; 9). The attacking
path from the malicious node to the victim is reconstructed.
4.7.2 Wireless self protection systems
Wireless Self Protection Systems (WSPS) are an advance security method capable of detecting
complex attacks and responding to these attacks. WSPS uses abnormality metrics collected
frommulti-channel packet monitors and signal analyzers. These metrics form a foundation to
recognize potential attacks, which allows appropriate responses. The collected signal, channel
and frame metric attributes are unique for each wireless network device (5). Figure 14 shows
the flowchart of WSPS.
Fig. 14. WSPS Flowchart
Signal attributes can include device name, encryption type, signal strength, and source type
(client station, WAP, etc.). These are good for detecting man-in-the-middle attacks and MAC
attacks. Channel attributes can include channel number, frequency used, IEEE standard used,
AP and master device names, and channel reuse. Frame attributes can include sequence ID,
date and time, source and destination (MAC and IP), packet size, frame type, application
name, source rate, and frame sequence number. Good for detecting replay and address
spoofing (12).
Wireless network flows (WNetFlows) are developed and explored by anomaly based behavior
analysis to identify relevant attributes of normal traffic (6). Metric attributes combine to form
a WNetFlow-key for each WNetFlow. Common attributes of the WNetFlow keys are utilized
to determine specific traffic types. Based on the WNetFlows, a prediction engine classifies the
attack. When an attack is identified, then a decision analysis function dynamically determines
an appropriate response in order to minimize vulnerabilities from that attack. Some actions
that can be taken include deauthentication of the attacker, utilizing the attack signal power to
identify the attacker location and physically stopping the attack, and shutting down WAPs in
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order to stop the attacker (5). Experimental results show that the WSPS approach can protect
from wireless network attacks with an average detection rate of 99.13% for experimented
attacks (4).
5. Conclusions
In this chapter, medical signal accuracy in a WLAN-based telemedicine system was studied.
Relationships of medical information processing and wireless communication channels
were discussed in an integrated medical information system containing the key function
blocks: DCT transform, data compression, quantization, wireless channels, and IDCT
transform. Explicit interactions between complexity and errors of each block were derived.
Transmission errors are directly proportional to transmission rates and channel noise level,
while data compression and quantization errors are inversely proportional to their respective
compression ratios and quantization levels. There is a fundamental trade-off between overall
information errors in these blocks. For example, the less the compression ratio is, the less the
data size becomes. Consequently, the data can be transmitted at a slower transmission speed.
For a given resource such as bandwidth and signal-to-noise ratio, there exists an optimal
allocation that maximizes overall information accuracy after passing information processing
and communication channels. Relationships between information resource allocation and
medical lung sound diagnosis pattern were examined in detail. When applied to medical
information processing, it becomes clear that in an integrated medical information processing
andwireless communication system, a small deviation from the optimization point of resource
allocation can result in a significant change in overall errors, leading to less accurate and
unreliable diagnosis. Lung sound signals were used to show the trade-off between signal
pattern accuracy and resource allocation. Lung sound pattern was correctly recognized after
proper resource optimization and noise cancelation.
Security challenges and methodswere also examined in awireless-based telemedicine system.
Enhanced security technologies both in enterprise areas and personal areas were reviewed.
Secure fast roaming and wireless SCADA systems were introduced. Finally, two advance
security methods for wireless telemedicine systems, i.e., wireless covert channel signalling
and wireless self protection systems were discussed.
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